Aviation Safety

ATC commands

KR#1 — Mon, 09 Mar 2009 02:45:27 GMT

I was recently vectored to final and was cleared to land. When I was no more than two miles out I was told that my clearance was canceled. I had not heard that before and was unsure about hearing it right, so when called a second time that my clearance was canceled, I responded that I was already on final, they told me to slow down, make S turns, and watch out for wake turbulence from the jet that was taking the active. My question is, what is the standard procedure for clearance canceled when on final? I think had I started a go around I might have caught up with the departing traffic, luckily I was slow and able to land safely with no problems, I have just been concerned with my lack of knowledge with clearance canceled. Your thoughts and opinions are appreciated.

The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff.

chickenlittle92071 — Sun, 28 Jan 2007 03:57:28 GMT

To Whom It May Concern:

The FAA has told us that the lone controller at Lexington tower turned his back on Comair 191 and was busy with "administrative duties, traffic count" after he cleared Comair191 for takeoff while it was on the wrong runway. Initially, he admitted seeing Comair on the wrong runway and later changed his testimony..

The FAA released the tapes the other day and I downloaded it from their site at....

http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/accident_incident/comair_tapes/

If you download the ATC Communications audio (MP3) tape there and play it, you can hear Diane English, an FAA employee, say she made the tape from 0944 Coordinated Universal Time - 1026 Coordinated Universal Time on August 27, 2006. The accident occurred at 1006 Coordinated Universal Time.

If you want to understand what happened, download the tape and play it while you read the following information....

At 06:52 into the tape, Comair 191 calls clearance delivery for his clearance to Atlanta.

Christopher Damron, operating initials CD, the lone controller, was working four positions. (1) Flight data/clearance delivery(FD/CD) where he had to contact center and transmit clearances to aircraft on one frequency, (2) Ground Control (GC) where he had to issue taxi clearance and watch taxiing aircraft on ramp and taxiways on another frequency, Local Control (LC) where he had to watch aircraft on the runway and in the traffic pattern in the control zone out to five mile radius on a third frequency, and Radar Departure Control (DC) where he had to give heading to fly for arrivals and departures below 10,000 ft. on a fourth frequency. This is not too much to handle if things fall in a staggered sequence, but when you get busy, someone has to wait. You can't talk on four frequencies at once or talk to ten aircraft at once. In the business, it's called going "Down the tubes". During the day, all these positions are manned and in addition the local control position can be split between two controllers. There is a supervisor and cab coordinator (CC) also who monitor all positions to insure safe operations. I have a photo I took a LGB where you can see ten controllers in the tower cab.

As you listen to the tape, you will see that CD doesn't have a lot of time to catch his breath in the minutes before Comair is cleared for takeoff. After that, he has nothing to do. He let his guard down. These times show it to some degrees but his transmissions are sometimes lengthy and there is little time between each transmission.

At 06:58, CD issues Comair his clearance to ATL and..

At. 07:12 Comair reads back the clearance and admits he missed his arrival route into ATL. CD had to spell it out for him.

At 13:30 CD makes a blanket broadcast that the ATIS has changed to Bravo and the new altimeter setting is 30.00.

At 13:54, the controller, operating initials Charley Delta, calls ARTCC. He doesn't key his microphone while dialing (old rotary pulse phone) but has to key in to talk to center at 13:58. That is when you hear CD breathing and the music in the background from the radio. He unkeys his mike at 14:05 and the music can no longer be heard. We hear it again at 14:09 when he keys in. ARTCC hasn't come up on the line so the music can only be in the tower cab. At 14:08, ARTCC comes on the line and CD requests a release on Skywest 6819. Center releases him and CD gives his initials and hangs up at 14:12. The music stops at that time.

At 16:04 into the tape, Comair 191 advises he is about to push back.

At 16:09, ATC responds Roger, advise ready for taxi.

At 16:11, Comair says Roger.

At 16:32 into the tape, Eagleflight 882 calls for taxi and at 16:43 he taxis him to RWY22.

At 17:26, Skywest 6819 calls for takeoff clearance at RWY22

At 17:30, ATC says Thanks, turn right heading 270, Runway 22, cleared for takeoff. Since there was only one active runway, it is not required that ATC specify the runway when issuing takeoff clearance.

At 17:35, Skywest 6819 acknowledges cleared for takeoff.

At 18:33, Eagle 882 calls ready for departure

At 18:36, ATC replies, Eagle 882, roger, hold short.

At 18:40, Eagle 882 acknowledges, Hold short of the runway.

At 18:57, Comair 191 advises he is ready for taxi instructions and states that he has Alpha. At 13:30 the ATIS changed to Bravo and he was not aware that the ATIS had changed .This means he has listened to the Airport Terminal Information Service (ATIS) on a separate frequency which gives him the active runway, winds, altimeter setting, and other NOTAMS (Notice To Airman) about taxiway closures, instrument approach outages, lights out of service, etc. You can also hear it on the phone, as well. In the government pages of the white pages, it's under Transportation, Department of, FAA, ATIS. To his credit, CD caught this and re-issued and winds and altimeter to Comair.

At 19:02, Comair 191 acknowledges that he is to taxi to rwy 22.

At 19:09, CD clears Eagle 882 for takeoff

At 19:11 CD calls radar contact on Skywest 6819 and gives him further instrutions.

At 20:27, CD calls radar contact on Eagle 882 and gives clearance to 10,000FT.

At 20:48 CD goes on the land line and dials center (ARTCC).

At 20:55 CD again keys his mike and we hear the music. While waiting for center, Skywest 6819 can be heard on the speaker in the background saying he is passing 10,000ft.and requesting a turn to 300 degrees to avoid weather. CD approves his request and immediately center comes on the line and CD request a release on Comair. He had to be watching Comair approaching the approach end of the short runway because he call for the release in advance of him arriving at runway 22.

At 21:09 CD keys his mike and again we hear the music and hear him tapping the flight progress strip for Comair191 on the console. He asked center for a release on Comair and center issues the release, CD gives his initials and hangs up the line.

He immediately calls another sector and requests the 300 heading for Skywest 6819 to "get around some weather", but he had already approved the turn for Skywest.

At 21:19, CD tells Skywest 6819 to contact center.

At 21:23 Skywest acknowledges the frequency change.

At 21:25 CD gives Eagle 882 a new heading

At 21:30 Eagle882 acknowledges the turn.

At 22:07 Comair 121 transmits that he is ready to go.

At 22:10 CD says Comair 191, Lexington Tower, fly runway heading, cleared for takeoff.

If Comair 191 is at the approach end of the wrong runway, he is nowhere near runway 22. In an interview CD acknowledges that he saw Comair 191 on the wrong runway and NOT on the taxiway to runway 22, but 30 minutes later changed his testimony.

At 22:14 Comair acknowledged fly runway heading, cleared for takeoff.

CD immediately focuses back on Eagle 882 and ...

At 22:17 CD asked Eagle 882 if the heading he gave him worked for him or did he want a further turn to the northwest of the weather that's ahead of him.

At 22:23 Eagle 882 says "That looks fantastic, thank you very much"

CD missed the response and...

At 22:25 CD transmits "Say again, please" to Eagle 882, while Comair is rolling on the wrong runway. He is NOT doing traffic count as the FAA is telling us.

At 22:26, Eagle882 repeats "This heading looks great,

At 22:30, CD is probably looking at the radar scope as he is talking to Eagle 882 and giving him a frequency change to center.

This is 16 seconds after he cleared Comair for takeoff and he hasn't seen him rolling on the wrong runway. He was supposed to scan his runway when he cleared him for takeoff and should have noticed him on the wrong runway. He claimed he did see him on the wrong runway but said nothing to him and didn't cancel his takeoff clearance.

It's odd that a station agent for American Eagle saw Comair on the wrong runway, but the controller claims he saw nothing,..... eventually.

Here's the articles...

http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/16486163.htm

and..

http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/news/local/16486135.htm?source=rss&channel=kentucky_local

In this second article, it states....

Damron told investigators that he did not know the plane had taken off from the wrong runway until a union official, who had reviewed radar data, told him. If Comair would have taken off on the right runway, he would have contacted tower on departure and CD would have issued radar contact. CD should have been at the radar scope waiting for Comairs call instead of doing the traffic count.

According to the other tape I downloaded at the FAA site at...

http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/accident_incident/comair_tapes/

this one labeled..

ATC Phone Call to Fire and Rescue audio (MP3)*

CD pulled the crash phone and reported the aircraft crash, (an Alert III ) at 06:29 into the tape.

Again, the crash phone recording was narrated by Diane English. The tape runs from 1002 CUT-1013CUT on August 27, 2006

That means that CD pulls the hook at 1008:30 CUT. That is about 2 1/2 minutes after the crash. Traffic count doesn't take 2 1/2 minutes to perform. The accident occurred at about 1006 CUT. CD had to be doing something else for that other two minutes. What could he have been doing for all that time? Maybe he took the clipboard over to the radio to change stations. He wouldn't have gone to the bathroom when he was expecting a call from Comair.

He tells the crash crew that the aircraft is off the approach end of runway 8. That is the departure end of runway 26. 80 plus 180 degrees is 260, BUT then he tells the crash crew the aircraft took off of runway 22. I can't understand how he thought Comair took off runway 22 and ended up off the departure end of runway 26. If he took off of 22, he would have had to go off the right side of runway 22 before he got halfway down the runway.

If there would have been a second controller working the radar scope, CD could have been watching his runway a lot closer, but that is no excuse when the runway is the primary responsibility. CD wasn't focusing on his primary responsibility, the runway, but let his attention focus in the wrong direction dealing with radar traffic in the air. Traffic count had nothing to do with this accident.

CD had three departures in a short period of time with a lot of coordination with ARTCC. He is listening to music in the background. If he did the traffic count when he was finished talking with Eagle882, Comair was at the departure end of runway 26 or colliding into the trees off the departure end. Comair crashed before he started the traffic count. He should have seen it happening. CD should have been watching his runway. Aircraft in the air pose little threat to safety compared to ones on the runway.

CD never did tell us why he wasn't looking at the radar scope and telling Comair that he had radar contact on him. He should have been wondering why no radar target showed up at the departure end on runway 22. The traffic count scenario is just smoke and mirrors.

Today, I read an article about the FAA refusing to have weather band radios in the control towers siting it would be a distration. Here's the article....

http://blogs.usatoday.com/weather/2007/01/radars_yes_radi.html

According to a spokeswoman from the FAA, the decision to pull the radios seeks to limit distractions for controllers and ensure safe operation of the airspace.

We had a radio with a cd player in the tower cab at MYF and we used to bring our own cd's to work and listen to them while working traffic. Once at LGB tower, we had a portable TV in the tower cab watching a football game and I forgot to take it home when the tower closed. The next morning, the chief saw it and demanded to know who's it was. I confessed and he chewed my butt until I promised him it would never happen again.

Traffic count should be done on the hour and is a secondary function. The crash occurred at about 6 minutes after the hour. Six minutes prior to the accident, CD was busy with Eagle882 ready for departure. Traffic count is not important. CD had three departures and all he had to do was write down 0-2-0-0-0 on a clipboard to complete the traffic count, Takes all of two seconds. Comair was on the wrong runway for close to 25 seconds.

Here is some inside information for the layman, you don't have to turn your back on the runway to do traffic count. You read the numbers off the counter in front of you and put them on a clipboard, again, in front of you. He should have been watching his radar scope when Comair was no longer on the runway, again in front of him. There is NO reason to turn your back.

The pilot and first officer were given toxicology tests after the crash but I have never heard of a controller being tested for drugs or alcohol following and accident or incident. We hear of the TSA people reporting pilots when they smell alcohol on their breath and they have been pulled off of airliners and registered massive amounts of alcohol in their systems.

Since the 70's, control towers that used to be above the terminals were moved across the airport and the public never came in contact with us if we didn't want them around. At Christmas, pilots used to drop off gifts for us, it's an old tradition. We got candy and cookies, but the main item offered to us was booze, and lots of it. Why would you want to give your controller a bottle of scotch, I never understood it. When I tell people about all the drugs being used on the job, the number one response I get is "Well, it's a really stressful job, isn't it?" I guess they feel if you are in a stressful job, you ought to be able to shoot up a little heroin now and then.

The FAA knows that the public knows nothing about the functions of a control tower and it is easy to "hoodwink" the masses. Now you know the truth.

I came across a letter to AvWeb from a controller claiming things are worse now than when I blew the whistle. AvWeb has been able to confirm her identity. Her letter is at ....

http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archives/avflash/286-printable.html

I have been at this for close to 20 years now. Who is looking out for the safety of the flying public? The FAA ALWAYS says safety is their number one concern. If that was true, they wouldn't have hired one on my co-workers after he had been busted twice in the US Navy for trafficing in drugs. And another who would come to work drunk once a week. They would not have hired me when they knew I had vision problems. But they fired me when I had seen it all too many times and told my chief we were getting tipped off about random drug testing and over half of us were using on the job. He was the one who tipped us off the day before the drug team arrived so we could switch shifts with a non-using controller, if we could find one. And the guy who the chief told was the guy who was dealing all the drugs.

I have played tapes of telephone calls with my co-workers where they admit knowledge of druguse on the job to my Congressman, Duncan Hunter, and to the press in San Diego. Nothing is done. I have sent the tapes to the Aviation Subcommittee of Congress and to the White House. Nothing is done.

Who is going to stop this from happening again and again. We have been ignored, attacked, and accused of having our own agenda by the press, government officials, and family members of such tragedies as TW800, Swissair111, Egyptair990, and ValuJet 592. Now one of the Comair191 family members has asked me to remove him from my mailing list.

We are the head wiring experts from Boeing and the Dept. of Defense, airline pilots, two FAA lead airline inspectors, an FAA security expert who reported problems at Boston Logan and resigned after the FAA cooked his reports (before 9/11), an airline mechanic, and the inventor of the smoke hood for airline cockpits. Everyone talks about wanting to make sure nothing like this happens again, but when we give them what they need to do something about it, it's "shoot the messenger".

The press could report these crimes, but they refuse to let the people know the truth in our land of the free. I have told reporters that if they get this story past their editor, the next big story they will be working on is the bear problem at the dump. How can our President say people are jealous of our freedom?

Now YOU know the truth about what happened to Comair191. The NTSB final report will say that the controller had his back turned away from the runway and nothing more. If you don't believe me, look at how the NTSB covered up the crash of VJ592 and screwed over the families there. You can read all about it on my website at....

http://users.sdccu.net/chickenlittle

The Congress won't let me testify because they can't have everyone knowing the real story about aviation safety and the way they are watching over the system. We will just have to hear about more innocent people dying by the hundreds over and over again. I will be wasting my time for decades to come.

Regards,

James Bergquist

Air Safety Activist

Former USAF and FAA air traffic controller

Former San Diego Country NATCA representative

About EGPWS

Quayes — Fri, 11 Feb 2005 16:36:21 GMT

I want to know about the Details of Enhanced ground proximity warning system or(EGPWS). Now it's Manadatory Device from 01 Feb 2005. Why it is so required in flight? Please reply me briefly.

Contact Details:

Zahiruddin Md. Imrul Quayes
Director(Operations & Marketing)
Cascade International Ltd.
NDOHS,Mohakhali, Dhaka
Phone: +88-9136334, +88-0187083135 (Cell)
E-mail: imrul_Quayes@yahoo.com
        zumiqctg@yahoo.com
        confidentair@yahoo.com
Web: http://quayes.friendpages.com

What is the main cause for plane crashes?

bnhernandez324 — Fri, 18 Mar 2011 23:22:03 GMT

I am just curious with all the pilots. What is one of the main reason you think plane crashes happen? Is it the plane, pilot, both, ATC what? My main area of interest is proper flight instruction and safety in flying. I became concerned in this area after being a flight attendant and having a very scary flight experience. I would love some feed back! Thanks!

Effectiveness of the FAA WINGS program

plummea1 — Thu, 02 May 2013 01:17:50 GMT

Hello fellow pilots,

As part of a masters degree capstone project, I'm looking for people to help by completing a brief (5 min) survey on the effectiveness of the FAA WINGS program on general aviation safety. The survey is entirely anonymous, and your answers will be used to characterize the current program.

Link to survey:
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1B7BZFHHDGKI1Q1JeQUbu_pMm66n5g7Ncej4PWMlwVWE/viewform

If you can, please participate as this study will be used to evaluate the program and ultimately provide suggestions for improvement. Whether or not you're actively flying your input will help.

If you're interested in learning more about the study let me know, and I'll be sure to send you the details. Thanks!

Who Is Legally Authorized To Release Aircraft To Service Referencing FAR?

silverwing_z — Tue, 24 Apr 2012 05:36:40 GMT

Hi. I'm an FAA A&P mechanic working under a repair station (FAR Part 145). We have a Gulfstream GIV aircraft. Can I sign a post- and pre-flight inspection and release aircraft into service after maintenance? I'm not type-rated on the previously mentioned aircraft. If you can, please provide FAR references about this.

Everyone is welcome to share their thoughts. Thanks and have a good day!

FAA Regulations for EASA EU aircrafts?

karageorge — Fri, 30 Mar 2012 08:19:33 GMT

Hello,

can someone help me to find what FAR is used for European registered aircraft?

i.e. Is FAR 91.171 for VOR check required for EU registered aircraft or not????

George

MD-83 - Major Carrier - Minimum Equipment List

glen4cindy — Mon, 21 Nov 2011 03:15:34 GMT

Hello. I recently took a flight from LAX to STL, and we were sitting on the tarmac, due to the airport construction, we had boarded the aircraft in a much different way. Anyway, the forward cabin door had been shut for several minutes, and then was re-opened, and the pilots were in the cockpit pouring over what appeared to be flight manuals. The Captain then made an announcement that there was an equipment failure and they were waiting for an FAA mechanic to sign off on the flight so we could leave. The failure, according the the Captain, was in the Cockpit Voice Recorder. I have been searching, but, cannot find exactly what the rules are, but, apparently, flying without the CVR is permitted, as I would think at least the FDR was fine. However, being an avid armchair investigator, I was quite uncomfortable flying without a CVR, because, had the unthinkable happened, I know that one of the most critical pieces of information available to investigators is the CVR. How often do our commercial jetliners fly without this critical piece of equipment KNOWING it is not functioning? Would it have been required to ground the aircraft at the next stop to repair it, or would it have been permitted to finish it's duty day with a non-functioning CVR? Thanks in advance.

Pioneer 200 - Jabiru 2200 Engine Failure - Forced Landing on the Beach

duarte07 — Wed, 20 Jul 2011 17:40:12 GMT

A partial power loss due to a Jabiru 2200 engine failure forced me to land my Alpi Aviation Pioneer 200 (CS-UPK) at low tide on an empty beach in Portugal ...
Wonderful landing, without a scratch ...
No. 3 cylinder exhaust valve adjuster jumped out of its seat during flight ...
More details, pictures, video and portuguese authorities (GPIAA) official report in my blog:

Pictures of the Forced Landing, Video, Official Report

and

Pictures of Jabiru 2200 Cylinder Head and loosened Valve Adjuster

PS: Use google-translator bar on the right side of the blog page to get english text version ...

Jabiru 2200 Engine Failure - Forced Landing on the Beach

duarte07 — Mon, 02 May 2011 11:54:36 GMT

A partial Jabiru 2200 engine failure forced me to land my Alpi Pioneer 200 CS-UPK on a beach in Portugal ... without a scratch ...
No. 3 cylinder exhaust valve adjuster jumped outout of its seat ...
More details, pictures, video and portuguese authorities (GPIAA) official report in my blog:

Forced Landing on the Beach

and

Jabiru 2200 Engine Failure

PS: Use google-translator bar on the right side o the page to obtain english text version ...

NTSB notification requirements.

huey7563 — Sun, 10 Apr 2011 22:57:50 GMT

When a mishap occurs, being able to accurately determining if notification of the NTSB is required can add to an already very high stress level. It should be very simple to be able to follow 49CFR830 and make a determination, but when a mishap occurs stress levels are high and it can be difficult to make the best decisions unless you are prepared. Believe it or not there now is an App to help with that. Notify NTSB can be found on the App Store. It is a great tool to help you become better familiar with the requirements for notification and walk you through the process.

New Russian website about air disasters

Dmitri-ch — Thu, 23 Dec 2010 17:38:17 GMT

Hello everybody!
I would like to welcome you to my new website concerning the most terrible air crashes in history of civil aviation. Also you can find there official documents, movies about accidents, related video material and photos.
I just launched my project a few weeks ago but it's already gaining some prestige in the web.
The main version is in Russian of course, but you can easily switch it to English.
here's the link: http://aircrash.ucoz.net/
Thank you for attention.
Hope you will like it.

BR,
Dmitry

Sharing the Wealth

Aviation4Life — Sun, 05 Dec 2010 21:41:17 GMT

Hey guys,

I recently got set up with this new aviation company called Airnovus that specializes in aviation business management software and merchant accounts for aviation businesses.

I felt inclined and responsible to let people know because i feel that saving money for general aviation operations benefits everyone in the GA industry.

Airnovus was able to save me a lot of money by getting me a much lower percentage on my merchant account. The process is extremely easy and they have a $500 guarantee that they can get you lower rates than what you already have. Additionally they give you the software for free if you sign up with their merchant account.

Anyone that’s interested in making their flight school, FBO, or charter operation more profitable you should DEFINITELY look these guys up!

Their website URL is airnovus.com. Go take a look. It’s well worth your time.

Good luck!

The FAA has set up some specific rules and regulations regarding alcohol testing

Dan Smith — Fri, 07 May 2010 13:54:10 GMT

Alcohol abuse has long been a major problem for employers. The FAA has set up some specific rules and regulations regarding alcohol testing in order to prevent alcohol abuse in the work place. Subpart F in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 40 and 14 CFR Part 120 provides in detail all the FAA Drug Testing Program Requirements. The rules apply to safety-sensitive employees and since alcohol is a legal substance, the rules define specific prohibited alcohol-related conduct. The purpose is to establish programs designed to help prevent accidents and injuries resulting from the misuse of alcohol by employees who perform safety-sensitive functions in aviation.

Facebook - In memoriam Alberto Nassetti (AZ pilot)

filnax — Fri, 26 Jun 2009 12:55:37 GMT

Hi to everybody,

I would like to inform you that on Facebook it is now on line a page dedicated to my brother Alberto Nassetti (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alberto_Nassetti).

He was an Alitalia pilot. He died in a test flight crash of an Airbus 330 at Toulouse Airport on the 30th of June 1994. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A330_test_flight_crash.)

Anyone who is interested to visit this page can go to: http://www.facebook.com/inbox/?ref=mb#/pages/Alberto-Nassetti/46340334958?ref=ts

Filippo Nassetti

Missing airplanes?

wvbig — Thu, 28 May 2009 16:09:38 GMT

Can anyone tell me how many airplanes are missing in North America since World War 2?

HAND TOOL SAFETY TRAINING DOCUMENTS

esat.ozzaim — Sat, 17 Jan 2009 21:33:37 GMT

Hello everybody,

This is Esat from Turkey.

I need some documents or sources for hand tools safety training for aircraft technicians.

If anybody help me, I will be very glad.

Thanks in advance

DuPont-Conoco-AIG Cover-Up of Employee-Pilot Alcoholism Exposed

ICAO — Tue, 27 Jun 2006 04:17:42 GMT

DuPont-Conoco Gulfstream G-II N204C Prior to September 4, 1991 Crash This is an update on the causes and circumstances surrounding the crash of a Gulfstream G-1159 (R/N N204C), owned by E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company and operated by Conoco, Inc., that occurred near Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, on September 4, 1991. The article "Additional Causes For CFIT Revealed By The 1991 DuPont G-II Crash In Malaysia" corrects the erroneous account of the plane crash copyrighted and distributed by the Flight Safety Foundation, Inc. in the video “CFIT AWARENESS AND PREVENTION”. The FSF video and the report can be viewed at http://Iran-CONOCO-Affair.US/Iran-CONOCO-Affair/cover-up.html. A recitation of the facts that have only recently been unearthed by the continuing investigation of this plane crash can be found at the link http://iran-conoco-affair.us/Iran-CONOCO-Affair/fraud_files/3-C%20Opposition%20Exhibit.pdf.

Open Letter to the NTSB Re: Comair5191 investigation

chickenlittle92071 — Wed, 18 Jul 2007 18:58:12 GMT

July 17, 2007

Mark V. Rosenker
Chairman, NTSB
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, D.C. 20594
Telephone (202) 314-6000

Chairman Rosenker,

My name is James Bergquist, former USAF and FAA air traffic controller, and former head of our union, NATCA, in San Diego.

I have posted several articles on many aviation bulletin boards about the crash of Comair flight 5191 on August 27, 2006. I have also contacted many family members and their attorneys, the Delta safety department, Congressman Ben Chandler's office, and the Lexington press about my allegations about the accident.

I read a press release on the NTSB website at...

http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2006/060925.htm

Under the paragraph titled air traffic control, a lot of false information is listed...

Air Traffic Control

At the time of the accident, there was one air traffic controller in the tower. After handling several aircraft at the beginning of his shift, there were several hours without aircraft movements. In the 20 minutes leading up to the accident, there were three departures, including Comair 5191, from LEX under his control. The ATC group has interviewed several Lexington control tower personnel and FAA air traffic personnel. The controller on duty at the time of the accident relayed the following information to investigators: he cleared the accident flight crew to take off (from runway 22) and to fly runway heading (220 degrees); after providing takeoff clearance for flight 5191, he turned away from the window to perform an administrative task (traffic count); he did not witness the accident, but heard the crash, turned around and saw fire, and immediately activated the emergency response. As in all investigations, the group will review the controller's workload and duty schedule and the tower staffing level.

When I downloaded the FAA ATC tapes, I discovered that the controller wasn't doing traffic count after he cleared the stricken aircraft for takeoff but immediately diverted his attention to a previous departure and was performing approach control duties while Comair was rolling down the wrong runway. Traffic count could not have been a factor in this accident.

Additionally, there is another item that the NTSB overlooked. You are telling us that the controller "immediately activated the emergency response". But the FAA tapes show something completely different. The FAA tapes show that there was well over a two minute delay after the crash before the controller pulled the crash phone. That is a huge error for the NTSB to make even in the preliminary stages of an accident investigation.

I cannot understand how the NTSB would think that they can hoodwink the public with this lie on one hand and let the FAA provide the public with the tapes that clearly show that it is all a lie on the other.

Although I am an aviation professional and not a layman, even the layman can download those tapes and figure out the truth about what happened that morning.

Here is a link to the articles I posted on the Delta Airlines section of the U S Aviation Bulletin Board...

http://www.usaviation.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=33299&hl=chickenlittle92071

and an open letter to Congressman Ben Chandler's office...

http://www.usaviation.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=33302&hl=chickenlittle92071

I would like to talk with you further about the NTSB's investigation of this accident. Please respond via email and give me a phone number to contact you.

Best Regards,

James Bergquist

Air Safety Activist

chickenlittle92071@yahoo.com

WABC-TV Ch 7 in New York - Investigative Report Unsafe Landings at Newark Airport

Aviation Workers of America — Tue, 01 May 2007 14:42:56 GMT

This story ran April 30, 2007 on WABC in New York.

It involves an unsafe landing procedure that happens everyday at Newark Airport in New Jersey. The controllers at Newark have been trying to get the FAA to fix the procedure for over 2 years and have been continuously stonewalled. FAA does not want to acknowledge the 3 near collisions that have occurred in the last 22 months while running this procedure. The controller's union finally went to the media and this is the result. This procedure closely mimics the controversial procedure at Memphis Int'l Airport that made the front page of USA Today.

Check out the video here

http://ww2.7online.com/global/video/popup/pop_playerLaunch.asp?clipid1=1403003&at1=News+%2D+Special+Coverage&vt1=v&h1=Exclusive%3A+Newark+Runway+disaster+waiting+to+happen%3F&d1=251233&redirUrl=www.7online.com&activePane=info&LaunchPageAdTag=homepage

LEX ATC changes statement in Air Traffic Accident Package and transcript proves 2 min. delay in calling fire equipt. to crashsite

chickenlittle92071 — Sat, 10 Mar 2007 10:08:35 GMT

In the LEX ATCT air traffic accident package at

http://data.gannettnewsservice.com/comair/356224.pdf

we see the FAA's transcripts of the ATC tapes. Both the tower tapes and the crash crew notifications are located at the bottom of this pdf document.

You can see that Comair was cleared for takeoff at 1005:17

Comair acknowledged the clearance at 1005:21

Eagle Flight 882 (EGF882), the previous departure, acknowledged a frequency change to center (ZID LEX) at 1005:40

That is the time that Comair was at the departure end of the wrong runway (RW26) and it was too late to intervene to save any body's lives.

CD said he turned to do the traffic count and heard the crash and notified the Fire Dept. about the crash, but the transcript shows he pulled the hook at 1007:27, that is 10 seconds short of two minutes after the crash.

He wasn't watching Comair when he was taking off on the wrong runway because he was talking to EGF882. ZID LEX should have been talking to EGF882 instead of CD as ARTCC was designated to take over approach control duties when LEX ATCT was manned with only one controller.

Previously, we have been told that CD, the controller on duty during the accident, originally stated that he saw Comair heading for RW22 after he cleared him for takeoff, then turned his back. We have also been told that he changed his testimony some 30 minutes later to say he never saw Comair. The statements on this document say something completely different.

In this personnel statement (FAA Form 8020-26), CD states “I cleared him for takeoff around 1006Z and watched him take RW22” He is saying he saw Comair on the active runway and far away from the approach end of RW26 which he departed from.

His supplemental statement, dated the same day, he says “After the review of my original personnel statement, I did not watch Com191 take RY22. I saw Com191’s position on twy A, heading for RWY22. I then cleared Com191 for takeoff. I saw Com191’s lights turning towards RWY22. I turned around to do the traffic count, heard a crash, and saw a fireball west of the airport.”

When he says he saw Com191 turning towards RW22, he hadn't crossed RW26 and never did cross that runway.

These two statements are dated the same day, but have no time for the statements. We don’t have a clue how long it took CD to change his mind. Originally, I thought he made these statements to investigators, but I have had to make these statements myself after an incident and can tell you that you are left alone and given all the time you want to make your statement.

In this package, CD signed a third supplemental personnel statement on 9-6-06, some 10 days later, stating, “this information corrects information in the header of my previous statement” But he doesn’t tell us WHICH statement he is correcting.

So CD lied in his original statement about seeing the stricken aircraft on the active runway. Then he changed his statement, but still lied about turning to do the traffic count, because he was dealing with EGF882 when he told us he turned to do the traffic count. He doesn't mention that he waited just short of two minutes before he pulled the crash phone.

This information will be forwarded to Congressman Ben Chandler, Delta safety dept., the family members of Comair191, and to the Lexington press.

apron safety/security campain

shamrock — Tue, 07 Jan 2003 05:38:33 GMT

hello
im From portugal and im doing a study about apron safety/security in airports
if you have any thing concerning this subject ( pictures , links , cartoons...) please email me

tks much

I used drugs on the job as an FAA air traffic controller and Congress won't let me testify.

chickenlittle92071 — Sat, 17 Feb 2007 18:52:00 GMT

I used drugs on the job as an FAA air traffic controller and Congress won't let me testify.

To Whom It May Concern,

My name is James Bergquist, former USAF and FAA air traffic controller. I was also head of our union, NATCA, for San Diego County. I represent other FAA whistle blowers including airline pilots, Boeing and DOD wiring experts, two FAA airline inspectors, a FAA security inspector, and a mechanic.

I have never used any drugs on the job, but used to smoke pot after work while still signed in at the tower. In desperation, as I was technically using drugs "while on duty", I contacted members of the Senate Commerce Committee and the Aviation Subcommittee of Congress, telling them I used on the job and wanted to testify to them in open hearings.

See the response I got from our leaders who are supposed to be looking out for the safety of the American people....

Here you have a log of calls I made to John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee...

http://www.flight592.com/Flight592Discussi...10/000004e7.htm

and calls I made to members of the Aviation Subcommittee....

http://www.flight592.com/Flight592Discussi...10/000004e2.htm

I have a tape of one on my co-workers telling me the drug dealer told her I used drugs in the tower with him. I never used at work but used to smoke at home after work. He admitted using in the tower, I can only assume he told her about this incident in an attempt to get me to shut up about the drug use. She later reported him for drinking on the job.

I have been working local control and seen smoke out the window, leaned forward, and seen the drug dealer blowing smoke at the glass from the catwalk. He wasn't sucking on a Marlboro.

I produced a statement from a roommate of mine who stated she went with me to the drug dealer's home and he proudly pointed out 50 pot plants to her. I counted over 100 plants. He had 55 gallon trash containers full of pot and used to sell it when he and I would go to the FAA towers around San Diego when I was head of the union, NATCA.

I played that tape to Congressman Duncan Hunter personally and played it for the San Diego press. I sent copies to the aviation subcommittee and the Clinton and Bush administrations.

This controller was in the US Navy air traffic control school, was busted for dealing drugs, was kicked out of the school, and given a job pushing a mop. He then got busted a second time for dealing.

The FAA hired him with no ATC experience after President Reagan fired the PATCO controllers in 1981. That is how desperate the FAA was to fill the ranks. They fired thousands of alcoholics and hired thousands of drug users to replace them.

I and all the rest of us used to leave the tower with one controller on duty. We were still signed on the log and collecting the taxpayer's money while the tower was dangerously undermanned. So I was using pot while I was still signed on the log at the tower. I admit it. Busted!

Read my material, I talk about all of this at length in my open letter to President Bush and before to President Clinton. I personally handed my material to President Clinton while he was vacationing in San Diego. I have a tape of him saying, "I will be happy to take your material"

Why don't I see anyone posting here that they contacted the members of the aviation subcommittee, Senator John McCain, Congressman Chandler from Lexington, Ky., or the press asking for hearings into my allegations.

Let's get to the bottom of this, call all those Congressmen up and demand an investigation. That's their job.

You can see this little heretic thrown in jail for lying to Congress if you don't believe what I'm saying.

To quote Al Bundy...."Let's rock!"

--------------------

James A. Bergquist
http://users.sdccu.net/chickenlittle
chickenlittle92071@yahoo.com

Why remain seated while engines are running ?

RobertXYZ — Sun, 11 Feb 2007 23:22:34 GMT

I noticed that after landing some passengers leave their seats
while the jet engines are still running.
I know that this is against the rules but I wonder what the
reason is ? What are the risks ?

RobertXYZ

Letter to Congressman Ben Chandler Re: Airline mechanic calls the FAA hotline and 110 people die as a result of their inaction.

chickenlittle92071 — Sun, 28 Jan 2007 05:33:14 GMT

Congressman Chandler,

I have recently sent several messages to you containing information about the crash of Comair5191 at Lexington Bluegrass airport.

In these letters, I have asked to testify to the aviation subcommittee about the crash and other issues of aviation safety. I have heard nothing from you.

I would like to point out another instance where the FAA had failed to do their job. Again, innocent airline passengers had to give their lives.

An mechanic who worked for Valujet airlines in Miami called the FAA hot line and warned them about a condition which posed an imminent danger to the flying public. He even told them about aircraft #904, the plane that crashed, having electrical problems and illegal maintenance procedures used to fix the problem on the morning of the crash. He assumed that the FAA would finally do their job and rectify the dangerous condition.

After five weeks of seeing no action on the part of the FAA, his worst fears came to bear when VJ592 crashed with 110 fatalities. Imagine the guilt he suffered for not calling back sooner to insure the FAA reacted as they should and prevent this senseless tragedy. Here is the FAA document again which shows the mechanic called five weeks prior and three days after the crash...

http://www.flight592.com/NTSB/an.htm

The NTSB's final report on the crash doesn't even mention this important information and apparently never attempted to interview him. It appears as if the NTSB realized the FAA's guilt in the crash and attempted to look the other way to protect another federal agency, and even let the FAA conduct the most crucial tests of the oxygen canisters, which they botched as well.

Will the NTSB's final report on Comair 5191 tell the people the truth? See what the families of the ValuJet592 accident say about the way they were treated by the FAA and NTSB in their press release...

http://www.flight592.com/indictments.htm

I called the FAA hot line and they took no action either.

After TW800 went down, James Kallstrom asked the American people for help in the investigation. We sent him the same letter three times and he refused to accept it. Here's the proof...

http://members.aol.com/papcecst/kollstrom.html

Isn't it time we let the American people know the truth?

You could find this air traffic controller and subpoena her to testify as well.

http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archives/avflash/286-printable.html

We could face years of jail time for lying to Congress. I have no fear, I am armed with the truth. I don't need any screens or voice-altering electronic devices to protect my identity.

I have hundreds of hours of taped telephone conversations with co-workers, the FAA, the DOT IG, the FBI, the NTSB, and even the Whitehouse to play for you and the American people which paint a very graphic picture of the truth.

I cannot understand why you and other members of the aviation subcommittee would want to cover up these crimes perpetrated by the FAA. It is mass murder by an agency of the federal government and nothing more.

Please call me immediately, you have my number. We must let the American people know about these crimes. It is your job to protect the flying public, let's stop the killing.

This message will be sent to the Comair5191 family members, Capt. Quiello at Delta Airlines, and the press in Lexington.

Best Regards,

James Bergquist